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Abstract: The recent growth experience in India highlights the role of skill-based service 
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accumulation, which has only reached a new height very recently. In this context we study the 
possible impact of higher productivity of labor in the formal sector on the informal wage in an 
economy comprising of skilled and unskilled workers. More productive skilled workers 
depress informal wage in the short-run, but do not affect it in the long run, when capital is fully 
mobile across sectors.  If the productivity of unskilled workers in the formal sector improves, it 
may have drastically different impact on the informal wage in the short and the long run.  
Secular labor productivity growth in the informal sector may lead to lower wage for informal 
workers if capital mobility is restricted between the formal and the informal.  However, with 
full mobility of capital this will not be an equilibrium outcome.     
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1. Introduction  
This paper looks at the impact of growth in the productivity of workers in both the 
formal and informal sectors, on the informal wage and employment.  It is now more or less 
established that the recent surge in the Indian growth rate is much more related to a 
productivity boost than to a rise in investment (see for example, Guha-Khasnobis and Bari 
2003; Marjit, 2005, etc.).  If such income growth precipitates on the lower deciles of the 
income groups, then it is expected that the social consequences of the overall increase in the 
growth rate must be reflected on the quality of life of the poor people.  It is clearly a difficult 
task to measure such impact at the micro level and in terms of the various indicators of 
human development, and therefore, we argue that the informal wage is a good indicator to 
capture the income element, given that most of the workforce in India is absorbed in this 
segment.  Hence, for example, one may like to know how a productivity growth in the skilled 
sector affects the wage of unskilled workers involved in the informal sector, or how a 
productivity growth of unskilled workers working in the organized/formal sector affects their 
informal counterpart.  Before we provide further details on the plan of work, let us briefly 
visit the existing literature dealing with informal labor markets in developing countries. 
 Several empirical papers by Marjit and Maiti (2006), Sinha and Adam (2006), Olofin 
and Folawewo (2006) contained in a recent volume edited by Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur 
(2006) discuss various aspects of the informal labor markets and its role in the development 
process.  Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) and Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2006) point out the 
asymmetric impact of reform policies on the size of the informal sector.  Marjit (2003), 
Marjit, Kar and Beladi (2007) argue that liberal trade policies that contract the size of import-
competing sector and create excess supply of workers in the informal segment can still lead 
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to a rise in the informal wage if capital is also allowed to relocate to the informal sector.  
Empirical evidence supporting these claims is provided in Marjit and Kar (2005) and Marjit 
and Maiti (2006).  The theoretical structure dealing with formal-informal interaction in some 
of the abovementioned work captures dual labor market by including a high fixed wage 
formal sector with a lower flexible wage informal segment, in line with the earlier treatments 
of Carruth and Oswald (1981), Agenor and Montiel (1997), Marjit (2003) etc. 
  While the main focus of the earlier papers was to investigate the trade policy induced 
relative price effects on real informal wage, the current paper highlights the productivity issue 
explicitly.  It finds that the degree of capital mobility between the formal and the informal 
sector is quite critical in determining whether the benefit of a productivity growth in the formal 
sector percolates to the informal workers and/or whether productivity growth of the informal 
workers is eventually translated into an increase in their wage.  In the process, we extend Jones 
(1971) and demonstrate that the condition under which the mobile factor gains from its own 
productivity growth is altered as soon as we bring in some degree of mobility in a model where 
capital is sector-specific.  
The spillover effects of productivity growth on informal wage may perhaps be best 
understood by dwelling upon the aspects of free mobility of labor and capital, and on the 
vertical linkage between the formal and the informal sectors, of which we focus on the issue of 
factor mobility only.  The linkage effect is discussed in the appendix.  These, however, need to 
be supplemented by demand side effects when growth in income spills over to the non-traded 
informal activities.  Yet, we look at the supply side effects only, partly because the demand 
effect is quite standard and also due to the fact that the demand effect may not be very 
significant. 
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In a recent paper, Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) argue that greater agricultural 
productivity induced higher wage in the rural economy increases the cost of production in rural 
industries.  At the same time, greater demand for rural non-traded goods encourages rural 
industrialization.  In case of India, the mix of such effects has worked against rural 
industrialization. Thus, they show that the role of demand in rural industrialization is less 
significant compared to the supply side effects.  While the overall demand effect in the entire 
economy cannot be undermined, in the current context we are interested in identifying the 
supply side outcomes.  In fact, using these elements as building blocks, our study offers a 
general equilibrium model of production for a small open economy and looks at the labor 
productivity growth in formal and informal sectors.  We derive a set of results, by considering 
the short run when capital is sector specific, and the longer run when capital moves gradually 
across sectors. 
Higher productivity growth in the skilled sector in the short-run has an unfavorable 
impact on the informal wage, whereas in the longer run, it may not have any impact. 
Productivity growth in the unskilled sector is likely to have opposite effects on informal wage 
in the short and in the long run.  Productivity growth in the informal sector will be retained in 
higher wages in the short run provided Jones’s (1971) condition holds.  As we introduce some 
degree of capital mobility, the condition changes and the possibility of a rising informal wage 
is eventually guaranteed by a higher elasticity of capital mobility.  With full mobility of capital 
the informal wage must rise.   
The paper is structured as follows. The second section offers the basic framework and 
results. The third section attempts a simple econometric exercise to corroborate some of the 
theoretical claims. The last section concludes. 
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2. The Model 
      We have a three sector economy, X uses skilled labor and capital; Y uses unskilled 
labor and capital.  X and Y are produced by the formal/organized segment of the labor market. 
While the skilled wage is market determined, unionized bargaining determines the level of 
fixed wage for the unskilled in the formal sector.  One point should be noted here.  One can 
easily endogenize the fixed wage by invoking a utility maximizing union without any 
perceptible change in the direction of the results.  Thus exogeneity of fixed unskilled wages is 
not a crucial assumption and can be relaxed.   Z is produced with informal workers and capital. 
Informal wage is market determined and is less than the fixed wage in the formal sector. In the 
short term capital does not flow between the formal and the informal segments.  But there is 
perfect mobility of capital within the formal sectors producing X and Y.  Markets are 
competitive and technology is neo-classical.  We assume exogenously given commodity prices, 
consistent with the small open economy assumption. 
Following equations describe the model: 
The competitive price conditions are given by: 
XKXSXS Praaw =+      (1) 
YKYLY Praaw =+      (2) 
ZKZLZ PRawa =+      (3)  
and, the full employment conditions imply: 
                      KYaXa KYKX
~=+      (4) 
LZaYa LZLY =+      (5) 
SXaSX =      (6)  
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ZKZ KZa =     (7) 
 Note that. Equations (1) and (2) determine and r.  Then from (4) and (6) we determine 
X and Y.  Further, (3), (5) and (7) determine w, R and Z.  are 
determined by the wage-rental ratios, 
Sw
),,,( LYKYSXKX aaaa
.
r
wand
r
wS   It is easy to check that for (5) and 
(7) to hold simultaneously an increase in w must increase R as well.  A rise in w, given 
reduces demand for labor in the informal sector.  Hence, R must rise to absorb the 
excess.  On the other hand (3) suggests that (w, R) should be negatively related.  These 
relationships together analytically determine w and R and hence Z from (7) (see Figure 
1). 
,YaLY
                    w 
       F 
                     C 
 
               w*   
 
 
                 F                                                                     C 
        R*  
Figure 1                                                                 R 
Note:  CC refers to the Competitive Condition, FF refers to the Full- Employment Condition. 
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This structure refers to the short-run with no mobility of capital between the formal and 
the informal segment i.e. Rr ≠ .  We now look at the consequence of a secular decline in 
 and  on w, the informal wage.  Note that  LYSX aa , LZa
(8)  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= t
r
wfa SSX ,  
where, t denotes some sort of productivity parameter and 0ˆ <−= αSXa , denotes the elasticity 
of  with respect to t given SXa r
wS .  
Let us trace the general equilibrium consequence of a drop in .   A decline in  
must increase  as r is pegged from (2).  Note that this should raise X and reduce Y.  
SXa SXa
Sw
From (5) it is straightforward to argue that there will be an excess supply of labor in the 
informal segment following a production contraction in Y.  Thus w will go down and R will 
increase.  The size of informal output and employment will expand but informal workers will 
be poorer. 
 A secular decline in  on the other hand, raises r and squeezes down , reducing X 
and increasing Y.  Interestingly, although this may or may not increase the demand for 
informal labor as  drops and Y increases.  If the elasticity of factor substitution is strong 
enough, employment in Y will increase drawing workers from the informal segment.  This 
should raise w and reduce R in turn. 
LYa Sw
LYa
 The last exercise, we dwell upon is the direct effect of a secular decline in  on w. 
Given Y, whether such a change increases w depends on the elasticity of substitution.  With 
weak substitution elasticity wage can go down. 
LZa
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 Note that while productivity growth in the skilled sector cannot increase w, more 
productive unskilled workers in the formal sector may raise w. 
 
The Long Run 
Suppose capital can move freely between the formal and the informal sectors with r = 
R.  Also equations (4) and (7) are now lumped together as (9). 
  KZaYaXa KZKYKX =++     (9) 
 
Note that w is insulated from changes in supply of informal workers as capital moves in and 
out to remove any gap between r and R. 
 A drop in  now increases without any impact on r or w.  The short- run negative 
effect on w is now mitigated by the full mobility of capital, as X draws in the retrenched capital 
out of Y.  On the other hand, a drop in  will increase r, reduce both and w.  The 
informal sector and the skilled sector both have to accommodate a higher r in the process. 
SXa Sw
LYa Sw
 Finally, a drop in  must increase w.  This is also an unambiguous result.  As LZa w  is 
frozen, any tendency of increasing the return to capital in the formal sector is countered by the 
movement of capital into the sector.  Thus, the benefit rests with the informal workers.  In fact, 
the rate of increase in w will be greater than the rate of growth in productivity.  
 
3. A Heuristic Exercise 
In this section, we try to assess the above theoretical conjectures in terms of some 
empirical evidence drawn from the data on informal wage, formal sector productivity and 
capital accumulation in Indian industries.  As noted in the theoretical section, labor 
productivity growth in the skilled sector should not benefit the informal workers.  In fact, it can 
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worsen if capital is sector- specific.  On the other hand, labor productivity growth in the 
unskilled segment may increase unskilled informal wage.  In terms of a preliminary empirical 
exercise we use data on informal wage, labor productivity in the organized sector and fixed 
assets for the unorganized manufacturing for various NSS (National Sample Survey of India) 
round between 1989-90 and 2000-01 across various provinces in India.  We first construct an 
index to classify the provinces according to the skill content in their organized production 
system, i.e., the states are classified as relatively skilled and relatively unskilled in terms of the 
participation of skilled workers in the organized manufacturing within each state.  The number 
of skilled workers in any state is obtained by taking the difference between the total employees 
across all industry types less the number of wage earners in that state.  The degree of ‘skill 
concentration’ in each state may therefore, be simply stated as the share of skill in total 
employment.1  Furthermore, the states have been ranked as High Concentration (Rank 1) or 
Low Concentration (Rank 2) as per the respective skill concentrations greater than or less than 
the all-India average given in the last but one column in Table A1.  Interestingly, most of the 
states do not display any appreciable increase in the skill concentration, and some have actually 
registered lower skill concentration despite continuing above the national average during the 
period (1989-90 to 2000-01).  Using this information, we construct a Skill-Dummy for each 
state (value 1, if skill concentration ratio above national average, or value 0, if skill 
concentration ratio below it).  Subsequently we run a set of pooled regressions with real 
informal wage (manufacturing) as the dependent variable.  The data is available from the three 
rounds of NSSO, i.e., 1989- 90, 1994-95 and 2000- 2001 (see Appendix 3).  The gross value 
added (GVA) per worker in the organized manufacturing as available from the Annual Survey 
of Industries for various states, the real fixed assets in the informal sector (available from 
                                                 
1 See Table A1 in Appendix III for a ranking of the states according to skill concentration as defined here.   
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NSSO) as a proxy for capital stock and the skill dummy as three explanatory variables.  The 
GVA per worker in this structure represents the average productivity of labor in each state.  
The actual values of GVA per worker, the level of real informal fixed assets and the real 
informal wage are shown in Table A2 in Appendix III.    
The regression result offers an interesting, though exploratory, evidence on the 
relationship between annual growth of real informal wage and the growth in GVA per worker 
in the formal sector.  For the relatively “unskilled” states (i.e., for skill dummy taking value 0), 
the relationship is positive and significant.  However, the coefficient of real fixed assets is not 
significant.  On the other hand, a growth in the productivity of unskilled workers in the 
organized sector does have a positive influence on the growth of real informal wage, a distinct 
possibility in our theoretical structure.   
  
4.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper starts from a stylized fact that the recent growth in the Indian 
economy is influenced more by a productivity take-off as compared to other factors.  Such 
productivity growth is largely concentrated in the service sector, which has grown 
phenomenally over the recent years.  However, given the fact that the size of the unorganized 
sector is quite substantial, a number of interesting questions require serious attention.  As labor 
productivity in the formal/ organized sector increases, does it help the informal workers?  How 
does informal wage, a benchmark yardstick for the poor, respond to such changes in the short- 
run and in the long- run when we account for both labor and capital movement across sectors? 
We prove that higher productivity of skilled workers should not affect informal wage.  More 
productive unskilled workers in the formal segment may help the informal workers in the 
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short- run but definitely not in the long- run.  Thus capital mobility plays a crucial role in our 
analysis, when aspects of product market reform, productivity change, and trade related reform 
also affect the informal wage.  We have argued elsewhere that trade reform should help the 
informal workers provided capital moves more or less freely between the segments.  But as we 
show here, the productivity impact does have opposite implications.  For example, any reform 
that reduces the cost of capital in the formal sector must help the informal segment when 
capital is mobile.  However, under the same circumstances a productivity growth in the formal 
sector will hurt the informal workers.  One future task might be to isolate these impacts 
empirically. 
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Appendix I 
Effect of a decline in  and  with imperfect mobility of capital LYa LZa
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Differentiating competitive price conditions, 
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     Suppose , 0∈= 0,0 => βα  (Short Run, only Labor Productivity in Y goes up). 
     Then  iff 0ˆ >w
KY
LY
Y θ
θσ<1  
     Similarly for 0ˆ,0,0,0 >>=∈= wβα  iff 
KZ
LZ
Z θ
θσ<1 .  
Thus strong elasticities of substitution will increase w.  
Let us divide the numerator and denominator in RHS of (9A) by 0∈≠  
Then let (The perfect mobility case)  ∞∈→
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This proves the argument in the text.  
 
 
Appendix II  
Vertical Linkage and Productivity Impact 
We follow Marjit (2003). 
 
(10A) 
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(12A) ZKZLZ
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M is capital- intensive.  
In this model r is positively related to Pm as M is capital intensive and LHS in (10A) is an 
increasing function of Pm. Therefore, a drop in  must raise PLYa m and r reducing w – the 
same effect that we derive in the model without vertical linkage.  If M is labor intensive, r 
is declining in Pm.  In that case, one does not know whether the LHS in (10A) is declining 
in Pm.  If it is still increasing in Pm, then a drop in will raise PLYa m and w via the Stolper- 
Samuelson result.  So, we do have a different outcome.  However, if LHS in (10A) is 
declining in Pm, a drop in  will reduce PLYa m and w.  
 
 
 
 
 14
Appendix III 
 
 
Table A1 
Skill Concentration (Rank) States 
1989-90 1994-95 2000-01 
    
HIMACHAL PRADESH 32.64 (1) 34.98 (1) 24.33 (1) 
MADHYA PRADESH 30.37 (1) 30.49 (1) 24.59 (1) 
DELHI 29.21 (1) 29.84 (1) 31.80 (1) 
MAHARASHTRA 27.05 (1) 28.47 (1) 30.31 (1) 
KARNATAKA 26.03 (1) 24.84 (1) 24.24 (1) 
HARYANA 24.13 (1) 27.42 (1) 27.70 (1) 
ORISSA 23.81 (1) 23.73 (2) 22.96 (2) 
RAJASTHAN 23.60 (1) 26.06 (1) 24.38 (1) 
WEST BENGAL 21.84 (2) 22.17 (2) 20.01 (2) 
BIHAR 21.82 (2) 23.01 (2) 22.37 (2) 
PUNJAB 21.70 (2) 25.14 (1) 22.70 (2) 
GUJARAT 21.33 (2) 26.03 (1) 26.37 (1) 
UTTAR PRADESH 20.64 (2) 23.09 (2) 26.16 (1) 
TAMIL NADU 20.19 (2) 20.01 (2) 18.56 (2) 
KERALA 17.44 (2) 16.37 (2) 16.08 (2) 
ASSAM 16.90 (2) 18.31 (2) 17.83 (2) 
ANDHRA PRADESH 
 
14.42 (2) 15.21 (2) 15.78 (2) 
All-India Average 23.13 24.42 23.31 
Source: ASI, various years 
 
 
 
 
Pooled regression results 
 
 
Pooled Regression Equation (Random Effects Model): 
)()()()( 211 FAFsw ILnYLnDILn βγβα +++=  
such that,  
)(11.0)().0*61.0(07.0)( FAFSw ILnYLnDILn +++=  
R-squared: 0.33, Adj. R-Squared: 0.29, Prob >F=0.00, 0=ρ , Hausman = 0.00,  
* = significant at 5% level 
 
Where,  
wI = Informal wage 
α = Constant  
FY = Formal Average Productivity of Labor 
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FAI = Informal fixed assets 
SD = Skill dummy (Which takes value=1 for skilled formal labor, value=0 for     
        unskilled formal labor)   
 
 
 
 
Table A2:  State-wise Real GVA/worker, Real Fixed Assets and Real Wage (Informal)    
 
Real GVA per worker 
(Formal) 
Real Fixed Assets (‘000)
(Informal) 
Real wage 
(Informal) States 
1989-90 1994-95 2000-01 1989-90 1994-95 2000-01 1989-90 1994-95 2000-01
ANDHRA PRADESH 55859 93600 99091 112699 119314 298122 2535 7441 7037 
ASSAM 121584 102492 118578 15260 24942 31404 2665 5324 7181 
BIHAR 154334 174546 221411 171383 138364 195048 3308 5293 7974 
GUJARAT 117194 229594 283751 163235 219203 300510 3607 10739 12663
HARYANA 109689 150910 223213 50051 52169 157014 6852 9175 11028
HIMACHAL PRADESH 115405 188139 354982 56235 16102 33121 4460 6748 12009
KARNATAKA 120800 173724 194272 77874 101751 215801 2671 6342 8392 
KERALA 106577 78337 108657 60789 44697 159397 4446 7530 9718 
MADHYA PRADESH 147232 217470 265189 76709 92499 189710 2958 7966 8249 
MAHARASHTRA 185831 268129 315094 209950 303671 608403 4038 10974 12695
ORISSA 170424 158313 212283 44574 53120 72085 2438 5781 6592 
PUNJAB 116263 117541 130473 90991 32617 230536 2071 8026 11274
RAJASTHAN 103813 196273 251614 129626 63960 237915 2958 8008 12177
TAMIL NADU 106940 135241 149697 140946 94346 487575 4214 6812 9945 
UTTAR PRADESH 116773 192203 214509 312029 220188 565231 3490 6036 8405 
WEST BENGAL 67296 98239 106662 164692 125816 327097 3250 6828 8358 
DELHI 105609 222398 191485 81516 126654 433640 8741 11139 14783
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